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ABSTRACT 
Given the low cost of most cubesat missions, a full implementation of the traditional space systems engineering 
process to cubesat missions can be detrimental to programmatic success of the cubesat.  At the other extreme, cubesat 
missions often suffer predictable consequences from the omission of standard systems engineering processes such as 
risk management, configuration management, and quality assurance.  In this paper we discuss a scaled systems 
engineering approach to cubesat missions implemented on a programmatically constrained mission.  A discussion of 
each of the standard systems engineering processes and options for tailoring the processes for a constraint-based 
mission and how this varies from the typical top-down mission processes.  The intent is to inform the decisions of 
mission developers in determining what level of rigor is appropriate for each process in their unique circumstances 
and mission needs.  Examples of tailoring processes utilized with missions currently underway at the Air Force 
Research Laboratory's Small Satellite Branch (AFRL/RVEN) are used to illustrate the application of the information 
presented.
CONSTRAINT-DRIVEN DESIGN 
Small satellites are seeing significant utilization because 
they are intended to be both lower cost and more rapidly 
deployed; these attributes allow for a much wider range 
of people and organizations to build spacecraft. While 
small satellite platforms are not nearly as capable as their 
larger, more ‘traditional’ counterparts, they are 
facilitating large growth and investment. Since just 2015 
well over 600 CubeSats have flown [1, 2] and it is 
expected that much greater adoption of the small satellite 
form factors will continue with investments on the order 
of tens of billions of dollars [3, 4]. The schedule and cost 
savings appear, so far, to have justified the reduced 
capability imposed by this smaller form factor.  
With the growing interest, and investment, in these 
platforms there is a growing level of scrutiny being 
applied to the small satellite industry. Common space 
industry practices are being applied to small satellites 
that have been developed for larger one-of-a-kind space 
assets [5, 6]. Essentially, many organizations are 
attempting to develop small satellites to Class D or (the 
ambiguous) sub-Class D level of system engineering and 
mission assurance. 
While Class D missions can be applicable to any size of 
space system, the reality is that small satellites generally 
do not meet the intent of Class D. The growing 
prevalence of small satellites are also starting to violate 
the assumptions Class D was predicated on: that these 
are one-of-a-kind. Class D is a higher risk posture but 
has evolved (or always was) assuming a relatively high 
probability of mission success. The small satellite 
community, and the design principles therein, have 
evolved from the concept of pushing the boundary on 
faster innovation.  The small satellite community’s 
innovation cycle was enabled by the community 
adoption of the containerized 1U standard.  This standard 
has since been adapted to larger form factors but the 
fundamental design trades were developed in a form 
factor that were amenable for wide spread adoption.  
This standard has allowed the community to focus on 
innovation in processes and platform capabilities 
atypical of larger scale missions. 
Further, these systems are greatly constrained and often 
are not capable of achieving something like Class D. The 
form factor imposes many physics-based limitations 
(volume, mass, power), many technologies are relatively 
low Technical Readiness Level (TRL), and the greater 
space industry holds many misperceptions about these 
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vehicles (e.g. 50% of all small satellites are dead on 
arrival to orbit; the actual number is more like 17% [1, 
2]). Because of the perception that these spacecraft are 
cheaper and faster, their schedules and budgets are often 
more static than the traditional “big space” paradigm. 
This drives capability, system engineering processes, 
and mission assurance.  
It is recognized within the small satellite community that 
high levels of system engineering and mission assurance 
processes can reduce the innovative intention of small 
satellites. Where possible, the idea that a small satellite 
mission will “fit the box” instead of “building the box” 
has been utilized to help scope missions implemented in 
a small satellite form factor, as shown in Figure 1. While 
these ideas have been in the small satellite community 
for years, they have only recently been more directly 
discussed [7, 8, 9]. 
Constraint-driven design is where schedule, cost, and 
existing limitations (both technical and policy) drive the 
mission scope and execution plan. This is, so far, how 
most small satellite platforms have been designed and is 
in contrast to the “big space” requirements-driven 
paradigm. Requirements-driven design prioritizes 
mission scope over schedule, cost, or other limitations 
that may drive larger development efforts.  
 
In order to be constraint-driven and reap the benefits of 
faster and cheaper, a mission’s scope must be well 
defined and limited [8] or the scope must be flexible to 
reductions as constraints are realized. This idea can be 
challenging and even abrasive to much of “big space” 
but it is familiar to many small satellite crafters [2]. 
Assuming this step can be taken with mission 
stakeholders, the next most important attribute to a 
constraint-driven mission is scaling the systems 
engineering practices: the focus of this paper. 
It is a common refrain for those working on small 
satellites that certain practices are not conducted 
“because it’s a SmallSat”. This is, in of itself, not 
sufficient or technically correct. Small satellites go 
through all of the same phases and steps as any space 
vehicle however there are many practices and processes 
that are either done on a very small scale or not 
applicable. The processes also tend to be iterative versus 
serial, with smaller scale processes happening 
throughout the mission lifecycle. Tailoring of these 
practices and processes to be constraint-driven is 
discussed and recommendations are made based upon 
experience from various AFRL programs and the 
University NanoSatellite Program. Further, discussion of 
good practices for improving resilience/robustness of 
space vehicles, without necessarily increasing system 
engineering or mission assurance burden, are discussed. 
 
 
Figure 1: Constraint vs. Requirements driven missions [7]
VITALITY OF MISSION SCOPE 
Unlike the wide and deep requirements of the traditional 
spacecraft development approach the requirements in a 
constraint driven model are kept at a high level and 
focused on the specific capability that is required to be 
demonstrated on orbit.  The scope should cover the 
overall definition of what the mission is supposed to 
accomplish and a specific description of what the end 
result should be. Detailed (or deep) requirements are still 
necessary but they are only created when they are 
needed.  It is important through this process to not over-
define the solution space but rather the problem that 
needs to be solved.   
The key piece of information here that drives scope is the 
Minimum Viable Product which is tied directly to the 
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capability that should be validated on-orbit.  Each 
capability has at least one on orbit demonstration 
associated with it for on-orbit validation purposes.  Note 
that if there is not an on-obit test associated with the 
capability then the associated development is descoped 
from the mission. This scoping effort drives many of the 
systems engineering design trades that are determined 
through a mission lifecycle and fundamentally bound the 
programmatic constraints of the mission. 
In constraint driven models the scope of a mission is 
controlled not fixed.  It is expected that the scope will 
change throughout the mission lifecycle; this change is 
documented throughout mission lifecycle at 
programmatic reviews. It is critical that programmatic 
discipline is maintained to only add capabilities when 
they have made space by removing other capabilities 
first. Scope creep, where mission stakeholders add 
desired capabilities outside the necessity of the 
Minimum Viable Product, is a real danger to the success 
of a mission.  
It is critical to document exactly how and when a 
mission’s objectives are to be achieved by showing the 
major products, milestones, activities, and resources 
required for the mission. In traditional management the 
scope, cost and schedule imply high quality attributes 
which is locked down at the start of the project, 
conversely, in a constraint driven model the mission 
should deliver the desired scope, in the time allowed, 
within the budget allocated, and to the quality aspired to.  
The systems engineering processes tailoring therefore is 
a conversation between all stakeholders which is clearly 
defined at the beginning of a mission, so that mission 
expectations and programmatic constraints can be 
realized as early as possible in the mission lifecycle.   
SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESSES 
Though there are several definitions of the various 
systems engineering processes in use today this paper 
will reference the IEEE 15288 definitions and process 
breakdown. Table 1 presents the processes that we will 
be discussing in this paper, broken down into Technical 
Management Processes and Technical Processes 
following the breakdown given in the DOD Best 
Practices for Using Systems Engineering Standards 
document [10].  Note that several of the processes called 
out in 15288 are considered out of scope for this paper, 
consisting of Acquisition, Supply, Life Cycle Model 
Management, Infrastructure Management, Portfolio 
Management, Human Resources Management, Quality 
Management, and Knowledge Management.  Though 
critical to the success of an organization, this paper will 
be neglecting discussion of the larger processes and 
focusing on the processes that are within the scope of a 
single project.   




• Project Planning 









• Quality Assurance 
• Measurement 
• Mission Analysis 
• User Requirements 
Definition 




• Design Definition 









TECHNICAL MANAGEMENT PROCESSES 
Accurate project planning is generally considered the 
most difficult of the tasks that systems engineers are 
assigned.   One often quoted rule of thumb is to multiply 
your most accurate cost and schedule estimate by pi 
(3.14) to get a realistic estimate, or the constant e (2.72) 
if you’re feeling optimistic.  While there are always 
unknowns that will trip up any program plan, there needs 
to be a recognition that there are significant outside 
factors that drive this perception.  One significant one is 
the inherent optimism that is required when making a 
program plan under competitive circumstances.  A 
green-light schedule that assumes zero problems will 
always be unrealistic, especially under cost-plus 
contracting; Firm-fixed price contracting has a strong 
tendency to bring clear-eyed realism to cost and schedule 
discussions, with those most familiar with the challenges 
of the project able to inject their concerns into the 
planning process.  This, in turn, forces difficult 
discussions significantly earlier in the program, 
requiring more realistic cost-benefit trades to be made at 
the user level, and helps temper unrealistic expectations 
from mission sponsors.  Cost overruns are still a 
significant fact of life, but when constraints imposed on 
missions are rooted in reality and cancellation is more 
than a threat, but a valid option for a program, cost and 
schedule realism can become part of the organizational 
culture. 
Generally, even the cheapest missions will still undergo 
the full review process that is inherent in the Project 
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Assessment and Control process.  Tailoring is applied to 
the individual review, with a certain level of informality 
and relaxation of rigor to the requirements that are levied 
at each review.  One critical piece that is shared between 
this and the Decision Management process is to push the 
decision making power as far down the organization as 
possible [7].  This has the effect of minimizing the need 
to bring the reviewers up to speed on the current state of 
the mission and allows the review to focus on the current 
issues that need addressing before moving forward.  
Continuity of management (driven by short schedules) 
also helps this process drastically, maintaining 
familiarity with the mission and knowledge of the 
previous decisions. 
Risk management is generally one area where process is 
tailored generally falls to an identification of the primary 
risks at every review, with appropriate mitigation as it 
relates to the mission success.  For many missions, large 
risk items that would be unacceptable for higher class 
missions are routinely accepted, such as the use of 
industrial quality electronics and unknown radiation 
susceptibility (generally a community practice).  
Mitigating the lack of more structured risk management 
is the smaller teams that are enforced by the low budgets 
of these missions. The improved communication 
amongst the small team allows the systems engineers to 
discover the risks inherent in specific courses of action.  
Also key is having the expertise available necessary to 
understand new found risks and mitigations quickly. 
The adoption of new toolsets such as Confluence or other 
wiki-based systems has enabled significantly lower 
friction information management processes than 
predecessor file-based toolsets.  Accompanying 
delegation down the organization structure of approval 
and review authority, as well as relaxation of some of the 
related formalisms also simplifies and speeds 
information transfer through the wiki-based toolsets. 
Configuration management and quality assurance are 
often lumped together because of the overlap in both 
objectives and processes.  A significant relaxation that is 
applied is the ability to work both tests and assembly 
procedures without detailed procedures.  When the test 
requirements and test flow has been discussed with the 
appropriate approvers the test can be run and 
documented live, providing a significant speedup.  
Integration with the wiki-based information 
management system has also improved the ability to 
capture critical information from the procedure.  Some 
relaxation of the standard two person rule has been 
tolerated, mostly in relaxing the knowledge requirements 
of the second person, where a tech or engineer with 
unrelated expertise can review and sign off on an action 
with appropriate explanation by the acting person.  Flight 
hardware handling practices include ESD safety, 
smocks, hairnets, gloves, and a class 10K clean 
environment.   
Measurement processes are generally associated with 
tool location and calibration tracking.  Poor calibration 
practices can come back to damage a spacecraft in the 
most inopportune times, giving little options to scale 
back calibration practices.  In general, tools lost inside 
spacecraft hardware can be mission ending, but with 
spacecraft as small as these there are few opportunities 
to misplace tools.    
For many of these systems engineering processes there 
is the recognition that while process can improve 
consistency, in can also reduce individual responsibility 
and ownership.  Delegation of authority is critical to 
improve ownership and responsibility such that 
relaxation of process can reduce cost and schedule 
without catastrophic results. 
TECHNICAL PROCESSES 
The technical processes in Table 1 generally follow a 
mission flow, with the exception of the System Analysis 
process, which is cross cutting throughout the mission.  
Figure 2 shows the connection between the processes 
and the mission lifecycle for a satellite mission. 
Concept development  
The early stages of mission lifecycle are likely the least 
well defined.  The goals of the early stages of mission 
development is to identify a self consistent set of mission 
objectives, requirements, and architecture that are 
feasible within cost and schedule constraints.  
Sometimes this is straight forward, such as when a 
customer approaches with a well scoped component test 
idea.  Usually there will be several iterations of concept 
development, including cost and schedule estimates, 
returning to the customer to discuss options and 
possibilities, before a committment is made.   
Concept development generally consists of rapid 
iterations on the systems budgets, such as 
communications, power, pointing, navigation, etc., 
evaluating changes to the mission and experiment 
CONOPS enabled by various options.  Impacts to the 
requirement set and system architecture guide new 
decisions.  Key performance parameters drive decisions 
and guide the selection process. 
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Performance
Predictions
• Mission Statement & Objectives
• CONOPS & Use Cases
• Constraints
• Requirements Analysis
• Architecture & System Definition
 PDR – Decision Point
• Design to Requirements
• Make / Buy
• Software Architecture
• S/W & H/W Prototyping
 CDR – Decision Point
• Flatsat / EM Integration
• Functional Test Dev.
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 PSR – Decision Point
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 TRR – Decision Point
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• Program Final Reports
• Lessons Learned
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 SRR – Decision Point
Results
• End of Life Disposal
 
Figure 2. Systems engineering processes and the mission lifecycle.
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The baseline for the system is implemented and 
documented in a system design model which consists of 
the CONOPS, requirements and constraints with 
functional, performance, and environmental testing 
defined, architecture, and the performance and cost 
budgets.  Further detail is required in a risk assessment 
and mitigation plan.  The generation of a self consistent 
system design model is necessary to progress to PDR. 
This top level description of the concept development 
process most likely applies across all mission classes, the 
key ideas that change with mission class is that process 
is looking for a well scoped minimum viable product that 
there is reasonable agreement is worthwhile to embark 
on for the cost and schedule resources available.  This 
can be low risk, such as a widget testing mission, or high 
risk, such as attempting to interface with a global satcom 
constellation that 
Design definition 
Between PDR and CDR the design is fleshed out through 
procuring or developing the subsystems and components 
that meet the detailed requirements.  One simplification 
applied is a strong preference towards buy in make/buy 
decisions.  Full design rigor is generally expected when 
the decision is to make the component in house.   
One simplification to the review and approval process 
that can be adopted is a peer technical review, which is a 
detailed, but often informal, assessment of the work 
conducted on a component, subsystem, system, etc.  The 
intent is to get a second set of eyes to better catch errors, 
omissions of best practices, cross pollinate ideas, and to 
provide more cross-team communication.  This review 
may come from a subject matter expert or similarly 
skilled engineer from another project. 
In many cases it is quicker and cheaper to begin 
prototyping early in this process, allowing the engineers 
to evaluate design and component selection decisions 
while providing time to correct mistakes.  The increasing 
complexity the various ICs available today increases the 
challenge of catching errors at the schematic level, often 
the only way to determine if a chip can perform the 
required task is to prototype the circuit and work out the 
proper settings by hand. 
Canonically, software development work prior to CDR 
should be limited to architecture, prototyping, and 
planning.  However, most missions can attest to the 
wisdom of an early start to the software development.  In 
this case, the use of non-EEE parts can significantly 
enhance the capability of the processing on the 
spacecraft, and has enabled significant sophistication in 
the flight software of cubesat missions.  At the same 
time, if mission scope can be reduced sufficiently the 
mission logic may be able to fit in basic microcontrollers, 
significantly reducing the time and financial investment 
required for the software development. 
Certain judicial enhancements to the mission at this 
design stage can minimize cost and personnel 
commitments during both testing and operations.  One 
requirement that is generally carried on AFRL/RVEN 
missions is to be power positive in a tumble.  This 
requirement enables the critical components to be 
reduced to the power, TT&C, and connecting 
subsystems (usually command and data handling).  The 
elimination of the attitude determination and control 
subsystem from the system safe mode allows for both 
simplified operations (e.g. business hours only, 
progressing to unattended operations), and a reduction in 
testing in the ADCS system, due to the knowledge that it 
is not a critical subsystem. 
System analysis 
The system design model is the central analysis tool that 
supports the systems analysis portion of the systems 
engineering process.  The model captures the mission 
and experiment CONOPS, the requirements flowdown, 
product break down and work break down structure, and 
the ICDs.   
The interaction between the system design model and the 
system changes throughout the mission lifetime.  Most 
of the design work on the mission occurs in the system 
design model prior to PDR.  Between PDR and CDR the 
model is updated to reflect component availability and 
feasibility, cost benefit analyses, design trades, and 
evolving schedule and cost constraints.  The final 
CONOPS scenarios, design, and expected performance 
are captured at CDR. 
After CDR the model serves as the basis for defining test 
campaigns and incorporating test results into 
performance predictions.  The model informs flatsat, 
hardware-in-the-loop and software-in-the-loop testing 
and provides the proper location to incorporate the 
record as-built performance and calculate system 
margins and capability.  It also provides the ability to 
analyze the impact of a failed test and informs the 
decision to modify the design, modify the test, or accept 
it as is with a waiver. 
In AI&T, the model helps specify the functional and 
environmental testing to ensure a test-as-you-fly 
approach.  As final testing wraps up the model is used to 
develop operations plans and a mission planning toolset 
for use during early, nominal and contingency 
operations. 
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Implementation 
The functions of implementation are the procurement 
and fabrication of the various parts, components, and 
subsystems.  One particularly powerful simplification of 
this process in the use of a flatsat, where non-flight 
boards and harnesses are electrically integrated in a 
tabletop setting.  This encourages rapid identification 
and correction of flaws in design, ICD mismatches, and 
most non-mechanical issues.  The flatsat allows for 
breaking connections and break-out box level 
verification of key measurements that are infeasible after 
mechanical integration 
The flatsat also allows for early functional test 
development, which provides time for iteration on the 
functional test procedures and helps in catching design 
flaws, allowing for later flight hardware functional tests 
to only focus on workmanship flaws.  A heavy focus is 
placed on test scripting. 
The flatsat also provides an ideal platform for flight 
software testing.  The acceleration of flight software 
development on the flatsat is likely sufficient 
justification for the apparent extra effort even without the 
other advantages described here. 
Assembly, Integration, & Testing 
The AI&T phase of any mission can make or break both 
a mission’s schedule and budget. During this phase of 
mission development, many of the investments or shot 
comings made in the earlier missing phases are realized. 
Traditional mission AI&T focuses heavily on the 
carefully developed integration procedures with multiple 
levels of inspection and may even include the 
construction of an engineering unit to test these 
procedures. These practices, while well suited for 
Requirements-driven missions, significantly increase 
both the cost and schedule for the mission. For 
Constraint-driven missions, similar levels of mission 
assurance can be achieved through the application of 
some simple design practices and lean integration 
processes specifically applied to mission critical 
integration activities. 
In general, small satellite missions are designed and built 
by much smaller teams than their traditional 
counterparts. This allows the design team to also act as 
the AI&T team. Having these functions so closely 
coupled allows the AI&T team to become experts with 
their system during the design and since they don’t 
handoff AI&T to a separate team, there is less need to 
meticulously design integration procedures. With this 
level of understanding of the design intent, procedures 
can focus on critical integration activities, such as optical 
alignments, and less on the integration of more robust 
systems. 
The testing and verification of constraint-driven 
missions also varies significantly from the traditional 
paradigm. While the same objectives of verifying that 
the system will survive launch and perform the mission 
objective still apply, the level to which this verification 
is performed is where constrain-driven missions vary the 
most. For these missions, it has been found the that the 
greatest return on investment comes from the following 
basic tests: 
Functional Day-in-the-Life (DITL) 
DITL testing, when properly designed, should accurately 
demonstrate the critical functionality of the spacecraft. 
This usually focuses first on initial startup and system 
checkout and then exercises the operational modes. 
Some simple error detection and recovery testing may be 
performed but it is not the intent of constraint-driven 
DITL to exercise all of the edge cases but to simply 
verify that the system performs as intended.  This test 
specifically includes the launch and early operations 
sequence. 
Power Characterization 
As the power subsystem represents the lifeblood of the 
spacecraft, significant efforts are expended to verify the 
full functionality of the subsystem.  This includes 
verification of the depth of discharge, recharge through 
solar panels, autonomous recognition of safety limits on 
the battery, proper inhibit functionality, load testing and 
switching, and proper telemetry production. 
Long Range Communications Verification  
Small satellite systems present a unique opportunity to 
test a full end to end communications path of the satellite 
that simply could not be performed with larger systems. 
Due to their size, the satellite can either be tested by free 
air radiating with a significant distance between the test 
antenna and the satellite or even with an actual ground 
station asset. It has been found that many issues can be 
discovered by performing a long range test that would 
otherwise be missed when using either an antenna hat or 
performing attenuated hardline tests. 
Command and Execution Test 
Full verification of the software functionality is required, 
though there is some flexibility on whether that is 
performed on the flatsat, flight vehicle, or a simulator.  
This is an execution of each command in the Command 
and Telemetry List (CTL).  The depth to which all the 
various permutations of arguments for each command is 
verified is allowed to fluctuate depending on the mission. 
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Full Functional Test 
Functional testing on the balance of the subsystems is 
allowed to stay at a high level, emulating the expected 
use cases that each component may see in operations.  If 
failures are encountered further investigation is required.  
Often there are edge and corner cases that are not well 
explored or tested, and these can be discovered on orbit.  
The expectation is that as long as the critical subsystems 
are well characterized these faults are recoverable and 
can be dealt with during operations. 
CG/MOI Testing and Polarity Checks 
These tests gather the required information to ensure that 
the ADCS system and algorithms are provided with the 
most accurate information. The polarity checks also 
ensure that the sensors and actuators were installed 
correctly.  
Other tests that may be performed, given the specific risk 
tolerance posture of the mission, these include 
EMI/EMC testing, detailed ADCS testing, and payload 
performance testing. 
Vibration Testing 
More traditional systems may test all components 
independently prior to integration and modeling the 
integrated system prior to full vehicle vibration testing. 
Constraint-driven missions can realize significant cost 
and schedule savings by only vibration testing the fully 
integrated system and limiting modal modeling to only 
extremely sensitive components.  
Thermal Vacuum Testing 
Testing the system under both hot and cold vacuum 
ensures that the system will perform as designed on orbit. 
While the duration and number of cycles can vary from 
mission to mission, limiting the number of cycles can 
significantly reduce the cost and schedule.  
MISSION OPERATIONS 
Traditional mission operations consist of several 
operators sending command sets up to the spacecraft in 
a serial process. This method of controlling is well suited 
for the requirements-driven mission as it provides a man 
in the loop to ensure that the spacecraft remains 
operational as much as possible. 
For a constraint-driven mission this operations paradigm 
must also be adjusted. Many of these missions have 
much more constrained operations budgets that drive a 
push to operate as “lights out” as possible. “Lights out” 
operation is a method of operating a spacecraft with 
either very limited or actually zero controllers sitting in 
the mission control center.  
This operations method is achieved through the careful 
design of the constraint-driven system to include two 
design principles. The first of these is a tumble proof 
COM link. By providing a communications link that can 
still close the link with the ground even in a tumble, 
operators can recover the vehicle from anomalies much 
quicker as well as monitor the system state of health even 
in if it currently is unable to recover from a current power 
condition. Once the power system recovers, operators 
can then proceed with bringing the system back online.  
The second operations enabling principle is to utilize the 
DITL testing to develop mission operations scripting. By 
developing and utilizing this scripting during the testing 
phase, these command sets can be “canned” and used for 
future operations. By designing in this way, operations 
planning can then be accomplished during a weekly 
planning meeting rather than the more traditional daily 
planning.  
CONCLUSIONS 
The majority of space organizations have evolved to be 
requirements driven such that meeting mission goals, 
and scope, take a level of precedence over cost and 
schedule due to the limited access to space. However, as 
access to space continues to expand for small satellites, 
and the need for rapid capability development increases, 
schedule and cost are driving mission lifecycles. These 
Constraint-Based missions require tailored systems 
engineering practices that prioritize demonstrated 
capability with a lower performance over 
undemonstrated capability with higher performance. The 
small satellite community should adopt a process that 
verifies mission success allowing the mission validation 
to occur on orbit allowing rapid demonstration of 
capability.  
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